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We examine environmental factors as potential determinants of international migration. We 
distinguish between unexpected short-run factors, captured by natural disasters, as well as 
long-run climate change and climate variability. Building on a simple neo-classical model we 
use a panel dataset of bilateral migration flows for the period 1960-2000, the time and dyadic 
dimensions of which additionally allow us to control for numerous time-varying and time 
invariant factors. As a whole, we find little direct impact of climatic change on international 
migration in the medium to long run across our entire sample. Using the rate of urbanization 
as a proxy for internal migration we find strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater 
flows of migrants to urban environs. 
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Climate change remains at the vanguard of the international development policy debate. The
Stern Review (2007) while analyzing the economic impact of climate change emphasized the
global consequences of inaction, the need for a coordinated international response and the
fact that developing countries will likely suﬀer disproportionately. This ﬁnal point was also
stressed in the ﬁrst UN intergovernmental report on climate change, which further stated that
”the gravest eﬀects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions will be
displaced” (IPCC 1990). Myers (1996) counted some 25 million ’environmental refugees’ in
1995 alone and forecast some 200 million by 2050 (Myers 2002). Although the term ’environ-
mental migrant’ is perhaps not a useful distinction to make (Castles 2002), these estimates
nevertheless highlight the magnitude of possible future movements that might at least in part
be driven by environmental change. Despite these dire predictions, surprisingly few papers
examine either the direct or indirect impacts of environmental factors on international migra-
tion. This article contributes to the literature by examining, for the ﬁrst time, the overall
(macroeconomic) impact of the eﬀects of climate change on international migration in a panel
of global bilateral migration ﬂows.
Climate change manifests itself in many guises and may impinge upon migration in myriad
ways. These include extreme weather phenomena and variability in temperature and precipi-
tation (Boko et al 2007). Marchiori et al (2011) advocate two channels, (one direct, and the
other indirect), via which these types of climatic factors beget international migration. The
direct channel relates to a change in amenities at origin, or else to changes in non-market costs
such as a higher incidence of disease (Patz et al 1996). The indirect channel instead refers to
climatic variation in rural economies which leads to increased pressure to migrate to urban
environs. This in turn, results in downward pressure on urban wages thus creating greater
incentives for emigration abroad. In either case, the eﬀects of climate change most aﬀect the
rural poor in developing countries, exactly those which are least able to self-insure or adopt
alternative coping strategies to deal with the onset of climate change.
Piguet et al (2011) emphasize two main, interconnected arguments, which arise from the
global climate change debate. Their ﬁrst pertains to the fact that identifying environmental
factors as the sole cause of migration may never prove possible, since complex interactions exist
between climatic change and other categories of deterministic factors; economic, social (and/or
cultural), political and demographic. Societies already vulnerable in some sense therefore,
will likely be disproportionately challenged by the onset of climatic change, with the rural
poor arguably aﬀected the most. Recent studies for example, show that a one degree rise in
temperature in any given year translates into a reduction of annual economic growth of 1.1%
points (Dell et al 2008), or else a fall in per capita GDP of 8.9 percentage points (Dell et al
2009); approximately half which may be reduced by ’adapting’ to the environment, through
migration, changes in fertility rates or mortality. Furthermore, Barrios et al (2010) provide
evidence that sub-Saharan Africa would have reduced the gap in per capita GDP (by between
15-40%) vis-` a-vis the rest of the developing world should no decline in rainfall have occurred in
2this region after 1960. Since climatic variations aﬀect both individuals’ incentives to migrate,
together with their ability to do so; disentangling migrants’ primary motivation to migrate,
whether it be forced or voluntary, i.e. identifying economic incentives from environmental
’push’ factors, proves impossible. At the macroeconomic level, the best we can do is to
assess the relative direct impact of climate change and climate variability on international
migration, having accounted for all other classes of determinants. Since macroeconomic studies
examining climate change often suﬀer from selection and omitted variable biases (Lilleor and
Van de Broeck (2011)), the inclusion of all main classes of determinants together with the
implementation of a far more rigorous empirical speciﬁcation are undoubted strengths of the
current paper.
Piguet et al’s second argument relates to the political framework in which any environmentally
motivated migration ﬂows may occur, and upon how destination countries’ should receive
’environmental migrants’. These authors argue that the composition of future migration ﬂows
will largely resemble those currently observed, at least from the perspective of developed
receiving nations. While their detailed discussion of how such migrants might be received is
not directly relevant for the current work; their argument nevertheless serves to highlight the
key role of destination country migration policies as determinants of bilateral migration ﬂows.
This paper is most closely related to the wider discourse on climate change and the macro-
economic literature on the determinants of international migration, both areas of which have
been remarkably understudied. Climate change no doubt has heterogeneous impacts across
countries (Black et al 2011) which are a function of the socio-economic idiosyncrasies at origin,
and which in turn determine individuals’ vulnerability to climate change. As a result, many ex-
isting studies have reached alternative conclusions in a variety of diﬀering contextual settings.
Munshi (2003) for example, ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant and positive correlation between
emigration from rural Mexico to the United States and low rainfall at origin. Similarly, Bar-
rios et al (2006) ﬁnd rain shortages signiﬁcantly increase migration from rural areas across
Sub-Saharan Africa, but not in other parts of the developing world. As argued by Marchiori et
al (2011) this in turn led to increased international migration from across the continent. More
broadly, Aﬁﬁ and Warner (2008) ﬁnd that a number of variables which capture environmental
degradation are positively correlated with increased numbers of international migrants. Con-
versely, Findlay (1994) in the case of Mali, ﬁnds that episodes of drought led to decreased
number of migrants due to the tightening of credit constraints, the result of rising food prices;
especially to other African countries and to France. Finally, Kniveton et al (2008) provide
evidence of the opposite relationship between rainfall and out-migration. In the context of
international migration from two Mexican regions, they ﬁnd (in the case of Durango) that
greater amounts of rainfall lead to increased numbers of emigrants to the United States.
The evidence concerning the eﬀects on migration of unexpected climatic phenomena is also
mixed. Piguet et al (2011) highlight a weight of micro-level studies which conclude that such
phenomena result in short-term internal migrations, as opposed to long-distance or interna-
tional movements. Indeed, Paul (2005) ﬁnds evidence that the 2004 tornado in north-central
Bangladesh resulted in no migration whatsoever. However, a growing body of macro-level
3literature instead ﬁnds a positive relationship between natural disasters and international mi-
gration; see for example Reuveny and Moore (2009) or Drabo and Mbaye (2011). Naud´ e (2008)
ﬁnds only very weak evidence of any link between natural disasters and migration however,
arguing instead that conﬂicts at origin exert a far greater inﬂuence. Halliday (2006) instead
ﬁnds that earthquakes signiﬁcantly reduce migration from El Salvador to the United States.
Doubts persist however, as to the validity of the econometric approaches adopted in many of
these macro-level studies.
Environmental determinants have remained wholly absent from the macro-economic litera-
ture. In two of the earliest contributions (of the latest wave of migration research), Hatton
and Williamson (2001, 2003) focus on the demographic and economic determinants of interna-
tional emigration rates from Africa, and more broadly from various countries across diﬀering
historical periods, respectively. Using emigration rates at origin (and/or at the destination
level) tends to mask the fact that the migration process is extremely heterogeneous across
both sending and receiving regions. Rather the implementation of data at the dyadic level
allows accounting for the peculiarities between the two countries such as distance, diasporas
and cultural proximity that also play important roles.
Pedersen et al (2008) investigate the extent to which selection and network eﬀects foster bi-
lateral migration ﬂows for 27 countries of the OECD.1 They are unable to provide conclusive
evidence of selection eﬀects, which they examine indirectly by investigating the signs of the
coeﬃcients on the interactions of the share of tax revenue collected at destination with varying
origin country income levels. These authors argue this might be due to restrictive destination
country migration policies, which these authors fail to account for explicitly. This matter is
taken up in more detail in Mayda (2010) who again investigates the OECD as the destina-
tion region. A dummy variable is constructed which captures changes in destination country
migration policy. The results show that when destination migration policies become less re-
strictive, positive ’pull’ factors are found to exert a larger inﬂuence on bilateral emigration
rates (as when compared to the sample average). Unfortunately, the role of migrant networks
is omitted from the analysis, which might explain some of the low coeﬃcients of variation
obtained.
More recently, papers have better emphasized the underlying theory. Based on the income
maximisation approach (Roy, 1950; Borjas, 1987), Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et
al. (2011) investigate the determinants of the size and composition of migration patterns at
the world level, again using the OECD as destination countries. Grogger and Hanson (2011)
analyse migrant stocks, and focus in particular upon the role of the wage diﬀerential between
the origin and the destination of migrants. They omit the role of migrant networks although
some historical diasporic component will likely be captured by their measures of colonial
links. Beine et al. (2011) instead analyse migration ﬂows in the nineties and the extent to
which diasporas have contributed to shaping these ﬂows; while abstracting from explicitly
1The focus on the countries of the OECD as destinations in the majority of studies is a consequence of the
general paucity of global migration data.
4modeling the role of wage diﬀerentials. Both of these studies use cross-sectional data however,
which necessarily restricts the scope of their analysis. In arguably the most comprehensive
study to date, Ortega and Peri (2009) again draw upon the income maximisation approach
to investigate the causes (and consequences) of international migration to the OECD in a
panel which includes explicit measures of migration policy. These authors utilize the panel
dimensions to their fullest, since they employ both destination (time invariant) and origin time-
varying ﬁxed eﬀects to account for a multitude of unobserved factors which might otherwise
be driving any observed relationship. Unfortunately, environmental determinants are omitted
from their study.
The aim of this paper is to reconcile the various innovations from across the literature, to
test the overall impact of environmental change on international migration using a previously
unexploited panel dataset of international migration. We augment a traditional neo-classical
utility maximisation model of migration to incorporate environmental factors in the context of
’amenities’ at origin. We consider the onset of sudden climatic phenomena, which are largely
unexpected, in addition to long-term changes in both temperature and rainfall. Recognizing
the multi-dimensionality of individuals’ decision to migrate, we incorporate variables to ac-
count for economic, demographic, social (and/or cultural) and political factors which existing
studies have shown to be important determinants of international migration. We also account
for the role of immigration policies and welfare systems in receiving countries.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of long term
climate change on international migration at the dyadic level and the ﬁrst to estimate the im-
pact of natural disasters and changes in temperature and precipitation simultaneously. More
generally, our paper is the ﬁrst macroeconomic study to examine the determinants of inter-
national migration using a model grounded in micro-economic theory, whilst also accounting
for all classiﬁcations of determinants. Importantly, our panel includes countries of the global
South as both origins and destinations. The omission of nations of the relatively poorer global
’South’, results in the most signiﬁcant proportion of international migration being completed
omitted from analysis. From a sending perspective this is particularly important in the con-
text of climate change because agriculture remains more prevalent in poorer societies. It is
also crucial to account for Southern countries from a receiving perspective, since climatic mi-
grants from developing countries often cannot aﬀord to pay the migration costs involved in
long-distant emigration to countries of the relatively more aﬄuent global ’North’. The ex-
pansive dataset of 166 destinations and 137 origins, therefore allows us to better capture the
heterogeneous impacts of climate change across countries and over time. We exploit the lon-
gitudinal dimension of the migration data to control for unobserved heterogeneity of diﬀerent
types to provide long-run estimates of the eﬀects of climate change around the globe. Having
controlled for diﬀerences between countries, we then examine global patterns by conditioning
our regressions on particular country characteristics, for example the availability of natural
water sources or the relative importance of the agricultural sector at origin.
Using our primary speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd no direct evidence of climate change, climate vari-
ability or of natural disasters on international migration in the medium to long run across our
5entire sample. These results are robust when further considering migrants returning home.
Further conditioning our regressions upon origin country characteristics, we ﬁnd evidence that
shortfalls in precipitation constrain migration to developing countries from those which rely
more heavily upon agriculture and spur movements to developing countries from those with
fewer groundwater reserves. We further use the rate of urbanization as a proxy for internal
migration and ﬁnd strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater ﬂows of migrants to
urban environs.
2 Theoretical background: the income maximization
approach
Our theoretical foundation is derived from the income maximization framework, which is used
to identify the main determinants of international migration and to pin down our empirical
speciﬁcation. The income maximization approach was ﬁrst introduced by Roy (1951) and
Borjas (1987) and further developed by Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011).
The recent advances further consider migrants’ choice of moving to potentially all destinations
and yield pseudo-gravity models which can be readily estimated. One of the main strengths
of the income maximization approach is the ability to generate predictions in line with the
recent (macro-economic) literature on international migration. By grounding our empirical
speciﬁcation in a theory with a well proven track record, we also address one of the main
shortcomings of the macro level climate change literature, which generally adopt looser, ad-
hoc speciﬁcations. This model has been successfully applied to analyze the speciﬁc role of
wage diﬀerentials (Grogger and Hanson, 2011), the signiﬁcance of social networks (Beine et
al. , 2011 a and b) and the brain drain phenomenon (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).
Our model comprises homogeneous agents who decide whether or not to migrate, and then
their optimal destination should they have decided to move. Agents therefore maximize their
utility across the full set of destinations which includes the home country as well as all possible
foreign countries globally. An individual’s utility is log-linear in income and depends upon the
characteristics of their country of residence as well as the costs of moving incurred as part of
any migration. The utility of an individual born in country i and staying in country i at time
t is given by:
uii,t = ln(wi,t) + Ai,t + εi,t (1)
where Ai denotes country i’s characteristics (amenities, public expenditures, employment op-
portunities) including climate and εi,t is a iid extreme-value distributed random term. The
utility related to migration from country i to country j at time t is given by:
uij,t = ln(wj,t) + Aj,t − Cij,t(.) + εj,t (2)
where Cij,t(.) denotes the migration costs of moving from i to j at time t.
6Let Ni,t be the size of the native population in country i at time t. When the random term
follows an iid extreme-value distribution, we can apply the results in McFadden (1974) to
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where Nij,t is the number of migrants in the i-j migration corridor at time t. Taking logs, we
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Expression (4) allows us to identify the main components of the aggregate bilateral migration
rate: the wage diﬀerential in the form of the wage ratio (
wj,t
wi,t), the factors at destination Aj,t,
factors at origin (Ai,t) and the migration costs between i and j, Cij,t.2
Migration costs, Cij,t, are in turn themselves a function of components of various dimensions
and we assume separability in these costs. They depend upon factors that are dyadic and
move over time such as networks, which are captured by the stock of migrants from i living in
country j before the migration process takes place and which are denoted by Mij,t. Migration
costs are also contingent upon factors that are dyadic but time invariant, such as distance
(di,j), contiguity i.e. if countries share a common border bi,j) and linguistic proximity (li,j).
Migration costs also depend upon factors speciﬁc to the origin country but which are constant
over time (xi), for example geographic location. Finally, migration costs include factors that
are destination speciﬁc, either constant over time (xj) or else time-varying (xj,t). Leading
candidates for these latter factors include destination countries’ migration policies and the
benevolence of the welfare state at destination, which Borjas (1987) termed the ’welfare magnet
eﬀect’.3
2Note that Black et al’s (2011) categorisation of deterministic factors which include push, pull and inter-
vening factors is appropriately captured in expression (4)
3Alternatively we could have drawn upon the recent theoretical framework developed by Anderson (2011),
who derives a structural gravity model of migration analogous to his (second) seminal contribution on the
use of gravity models in the context of international trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Their key
additional insight, in the context of goods, is that trade between pairs of countries depends not only upon the
barriers between themselves, but also upon the various barriers of both countries with the rest of the world,
termed multilateral resistances. Should both country’s multilateral resistance increase with the rest of the world
therefore, then both countries have greater incentives to trade relatively more with one another. Arguably
humans, (even homogenous ones!) should not be treated as objects/goods since they are free to make their own
choices. Nevertheless, the key insight in these authors arguments likely holds in the context of international
7Putting everything together, our cost function may be expressed as:
Cij,t = c(Mij,t,dij,bij,lij,xi,xj,xj,t) (5)
Push factors at origin are collected in Ai,t
4, and these comprise; political variables (Poli,t),
demographic diﬀerences across origin countries (Depi,t) and environmental factors Ei,t. The
expected theoretical sign of the political regime at origin is unknown, a priori. This is due to
the fact that while repressive political regimes might increase residents desire to leave, they
typically also increase the costs of migration. It might be extremely diﬃcult for residents living
in a dictatorship to obtain authorization to leave the country for example. Foreign diplomatic
representation also tends to be less important in such countries, which in turn signiﬁcantly
raises the costs of obtaining a visa for emigration candidates.
To capture demographic push factors at origin, we implement the total dependency ratio.
This is calculated as the total population aged less than 15 or over 64, divided by those of
working age. A higher total dependency ratio therefore, indicates the presence of fewer workers
to support both the young and the elderly, either directly or else through the tax system.
Conversely, a lower dependency ratio suggests instead, that greater numbers of working age
people exist at origin, which are in some sense more free to emigrate abroad. Other variables
typically used to capture demographic push factors at origin include the lag (by 20 years) of
the birth rate, which is purported to capture a cohort eﬀect at origin, or else the share of young
people at origin, typically those aged 15-29, since it is this cohort which typically exhibits the
greatest propensity to migrate abroad (see Hatton and Williamson (2001, 2003)). Typically,
we would expect a rise in either of these variables to ultimately beget further migration.
Both of these mechanisms are captured through the total dependency ratio however, since an
increase in either the lagged birth rate or else greater numbers of those aged between 15-29 in
the current period, lead to reductions in the total dependency ratio.
As far as our environmental factors are concerned, we draw upon a similar taxonomy as Piguet
et al (2011), who distinguish between two main types of factors. First, we consider short-run
factors, i.e. completely unexpected natural disasters such as ﬂoods, earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions. Those events tend to drive people out of their regions within a short period of
time and with a sense of urgency. Second, we capture what we can consider to be long-run
environmental factors, which comprise long run deviations or variations in both temperature
and precipitation around their long run averages.5 In contrast to natural disasters, these
migration. We opt to use the utility maximisation approach since it has proven itself in numerous applications.
Conversely, Anderson’s theory in the context of international migration remains untested. However, it is
important to note that our inclusion of destination time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects will completely account for any
multilateral resistances in receiving countries (see Feenstra 2004), which is arguably the most important aspect
in the context of international migration given destination country migration policies.
4Note that given the focus of our paper, we do not devote speciﬁc attention to factors at destination (Aj,t).
The panel dimension of the data allows our capturing the role of those factors through the inclusion of dummies
combining the j and the t dimension. See the following section for details. By construction, their imposition
also captures macro economic eﬀects over time, which are typically captured with separate time dummies.
5This taxonomy is akin to that favoured by Lilleor and Van de Broeck (2011) when distinguishing ’climate
8environmental factors are (partly at least) expected by agents. We may therefore write our
expression for amenities at origin as:
Ai,t = A(Poli,t,Depi,t,Ei,t) (6)
3 Estimation
3.1 From theory to estimation
Combining equations (4), (5) and (6), whilst assuming separability in migration cots and







) + Aj,t − A(Poli,t) − A(Depi,t) − A(Ei,t) − C(Mij,t) − C(dij) − C(bij)
− C(lij) − c(xj,t) − c(xj) − c(xi) + ǫij,t (7)
This speciﬁcation therefore models bilateral migration rates, i.e. the number of migrants
from country i in country j as a ratio of natives from i who have chosen to stay at home.6
Since our primary focus is upon environmental changes as push factors of migration, we use
appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects and dummies to capture the impact of destination speciﬁc factors and
time-invariant origin factors. We ﬁrst use ﬁxed eﬀect αj,t that are speciﬁc to each destination
and each period. These capture the role of amenities at destination Aj,t as well as the role of
destination speciﬁc cost variables c(xj,t) and c(xj). Crucially, these variables capture migration
policies, which remain largely absent from much of the existing literature. The availability of
data capturing migration policies, or lack thereof, has been a recurrent issue in the empirical
macroeconomic literature devoted to international migration. The panel dimension of our
data allows circumventing this problem and signiﬁcantly lowers the risk of misspeciﬁcation.
Time-invariant origin speciﬁc push factors Ai as well as time-invariant origin related costs
variables c(xi) are captured by origin country dummies αi.







) + +β2ln(1 + Mij,t) + β3ln(Poli,t) + β4ln(Depi,t) + β5ln(Ei,t)
+ β6dij + β7bij + β8lij + αj,t + αi + ǫij,t (8)
change’ from ’climate variation’. Note that we do not consider the eﬀects of rising sea levels which are predicted
to result in large numbers of ’environmental migrants’, see Black et al 2008
6Note that this speciﬁcation diﬀers from the one of Beine et al. who analyze migration ﬂows Nij using
country ﬁxed eﬀects allowing to control for Nii. The ability to recover Nii from our data allows us to work on
a speciﬁcation that is more closely related to theoretical equilibrium bilateral migration rate.
9Given the size of the parameter space involved in equation (8), it is important to adopt some
parsimonious speciﬁcation in terms of observable controls. Therefore, with the exception of
environmental factors, for which we allow a detailed inspection, we choose a limited number
of key indicators which we believe capture the main fundamentals that drive the observed
patterns of international migration. We therefore include variables which capture the wage
diﬀerential (
wj,t
wi,t), network (Mij,t), political determinants at origin (Poli,t), demographic factors
at origin (Depi,t), physical distance (dij), shared borders (bij) and linguistic proximity (lij).
3.2 Econometric issues
The estimation of equation (8) is at ﬁrst glance straightforward. Indeed, OLS estimation is
feasible but is likely to yield inconsistent estimates of the coeﬃcents. One of the main reasons
for the inconsistency is the presence of a high proportion of zero values in the dependent
variable Nij,t, i.e. the bilateral ﬂows. The presence of those zeros generates two important
biases in OLS estimation. First, since equation (8) is a pseudo-gravity model in a double log
form, the presence of zeros leads to the exclusion of many observations. If the country pairs
with zero ﬂows have a diﬀerent population distribution compared to pairs with positive ﬂows,
this exclusion generates the usual selection bias.
The second bias is more subtle and has been clearly identiﬁed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro
(2006). They show, in particular, that if the variance of ǫij,t depends on the covariates of
Nij,t
Nii,t, then its expected value will also depend on some of the regressors in the presence of
zeros. This in turn invalidates one important assumption of consistency of OLS estimates.
Furthermore, they show that the inconsistency of parameter estimates is also found using
alternative techniques such as (threshold) Tobit or nonlinear estimates. In contrast, in case of
heteroscedasticity and a signiﬁcant proportion of zero values, the Poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator generates unbiased estimators of the parameters of (8).
As a result, we use the PPML estimator to estimate model (8). This model generates consistent
estimates even when the underlying distribution is not strictly Poisson, i.e. in cases of over-




The resurgence in migration research has arisen in large part due to the proliferation of avail-
able datasets on bilateral migration. This paper draws upon Ozden et al (2011), which details
bilateral migration stocks between 226 origin and destination countries, territories and de-
pendencies, which correspond to the last ﬁve completed census rounds, 1960-2000. Drawing
10upon the largest depository of censuses and population registers ever collated, the authors pay
particularly close attention to the underlying problems encountered when making migration
statistics comparable. These include the alternative deﬁnitions of migration, how countries
variously code their census data (together with how aggregated origin regions recorded in cen-
suses may be disaggregated), the varying years in which censuses are conducted, the changing
of borders of nation states over time and cases where census data are missing altogether.
The resulting database therefore addresses the prior lack of migration data for developing
countries as destinations, whilst also greatly expanding the number of time periods to which
the data pertain. This proves important, not only because South-South migration dominates
global migration in levels, but also because climatic change disproportionately aﬀects those in
developing nations. Moreover, since liquidity constraints are more likely binding in relatively
poorer nations; any international migratory response to climate change is more likely to be
regional - most likely to neighbouring countries - as opposed to the countries of the OECD, the
only countries for which, until very recently, longitudinal data were available (see for example
Docquier and Marfouk 2006). The panel dimension of the data proves particularly important
in the context of an empirical examination at the global level, since it allows controlling for a
plethora of time-varying and time invariant factors, across a broad spectrum of countries for
which data are unavailable. In other words, we can meaningfully control for myriad unobserved
factors which might otherwise confound results.
To ensure consistency across countries over time, we implement the version of the data which is
merged to the aggregates of the United Nations (see Ozden et al 2011). Two key issues remain
with regards the way the data are implemented in our empirical model however. Although
the underlying data relate to migrant stocks, we proxy migration ﬂows by diﬀerencing these
data for contiguous census rounds. The ﬁrst key issue relates to the large number of zero
ﬂows which appear in the data. To highlight the signiﬁcance of this issue, Table 1, shows the
proportions of zero values for each decade from the underlying migration database. Although
the proportion of zeroes declines over time, around half of the observations are still zero in each
decade. In the absence of an appropriate estimator the presence of these zero observations
would clearly result in a selection bias.







Source: Ozden et al (2011).
The second issue arises as a consequence of our diﬀerencing the data. Inevitably, negative
11migration ﬂows result, when bilateral migrant stocks decline over time. This might be due
to migrants returning home, moving on to a third-party country or death. Since no data
exist on return migration, chain migration or bilateral migrant mortality rates, our approach
is two-fold. In the ﬁrst instance, we take only positive ﬂows as our dependent variable. For
the sake of robustness however, we re-calculate our migration ﬂows assuming that all negative
ﬂows constitute return migration. In other words, we sum our initial positive ﬂows between
countries i and j and the absolute value of the negative ﬂow from j to i.
A ﬁnal issue is to recover Nii from the data to compute bilateral migration rates. Nii involves
the number of natives from i having chosen to stay at home. This might be recovered from
population data provided we can substract the total number of immigrants in country i. This




Our short-term environmental factors are captured through a natural disasters variable, which
comprises: droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, ﬂoods, storms, volcanic eruptions,
epidemics, insect infestations and miscellaneous occurrences. These data are obtained from
The International Disaster Database, which is compiled by the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters.8 This variable is simply calculated as the total number of natural
disasters in a given decade.
To capture long-run environmental factors, we use precipitation and temperature data ob-
tained from the TS3.0 dataset, created under the auspices of the QUEST-GSI project, and
obtained from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. The original ob-
servations correspond to high-resolution 0.5*0.5 grids and are collected on a monthly basis.
Area weights are used to aggregate the data to the country level. Annual observations are then
calculated as the average of monthly observations and decennial observations as the means
across years.
While the impact of these variables have found to vary across localities, uncertainty also
remains with regards the most appropriate way of formulating these variables for use in our
model. Measuring precipitation and temperature in absolute levels may not be appropriate
since this formulation fails to adequately capture migratory responses to changes from the
norm in climatic conditions. Rather these would pick up whether migration is more prevalent
from rainier or warmer countries. This is unlikely to prove useful since tropical countries,
for example, are more likely to be poorer on average. Any signiﬁcant results would instead
likely capture part of the eﬀect of GDP per capita at origin, which in turn would be highly
correlated with our measure of wage diﬀerentials. Instead, we calculate the long-run mean
average and standard deviation of both temperature and rainfall at the country level over
7Note that only a full bilateral migration matrix allows to do that. This explains why Beine et al. (2011)
who rely on the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) database are not able to compute Nii.
8See: http://www.emdat.be.
12the twentieth century. We then formulate the rain and temperate variables, both as (positive
and negative) deviations of country decadal averages from the long-run average; or else as the
degree of volatility of these climate measures. Volatility is calculated as the absolute deviation
of a country decadal mean (of either temperature or rainfall) divided by the long-run standard
deviation of the corresponding variable over the hundred years of the twentieth century. We
refer to these terms as anomalies throughout the remainder of the paper.
4.3 Remaining covariates
The remaining covariates come from a variety of sources. The wage diﬀerential is proxied as
the log of the ratio of per capita GDP in destination and origin. These data are taken from
an updated version of (what is described in detail in) Gleditsch (2002), which represents an
extension of the Penn World tables (Heston et al 2011). Our migrant network or diaspora
variable, is again taken from Ozden et al (2011), and is deﬁned as the bilateral migrant stock in
the beginning year to which a ﬂow corresponds. Measures of geodesic distance, contiguity and
linguistic proximity are taken from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010).9 The language dummy, takes
the value one should at least 9% of both populations in a country-pair speak the same language.
Demographic conditions in sending countries are captured using the total dependency ratio
at origin; these data are taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects database
(2010). Since migration policies are included in the model through destination country time-
varying ﬁxed eﬀects, our last variable captures political push factors from origin. This is
calculated as the sum of the number of episodes of international violence at origin over the
ten-year period to which a particular ﬂow corresponds, with the exception of the last year.
For example the number of episodes for 1990-1999 are summed and then equated with the
ﬂow from 1990-2000. These data are obtained from the Major Episodes of Political Violence
database of the Center for Systemic Peace.10 Once all of the data are merged, 137 origin and
166 destination countries remain, a full list of which can be found in Appendix 1.
5 Results
5.1 What the model does (and doesn’t do)
High frequency migration data are only produced by a very limited number of countries glob-
ally. Adopting a truly international perspective therefore, necessarily involves a trade-oﬀ
between geographic coverage and the frequency of observations, which in our case are ob-
served decennially. It is important to understand the consequences of this sacriﬁce. It is not
likely that we will capture seasonal or temporary migrations. Instead our results will yield the
9These can be downloaded at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm.
10See: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
13average eﬀects of climate change both over time and across countries. These will also be the
overall impact, so if a particular variable has a heterogenous impact across diﬀerent countries,
we will only detect the net impact.
Nor does our model say anything as to the composition of migration ﬂows, i.e. as to migrants’
status, since we assume agents are homogenous. The underlying migration database captures
migrants of all ages and education levels as well as both genders, but focuses upon an economic
concept of migration. To this end the authors strived to remove refugees from the database
whenever possible, the result of which is that refugees in developed countries are likely captured
in the data but conversely refugees in developing countries are not. Since our approach draws
upon the dyadic nature of the data, which indeed is one of its strengths, there is simply no
remedial measures which can be taken to add back in the refugees that have been removed.11
In summary then, our model examines the impacts of both short and long-run climate change
on medium to long-run changes in international migration. According to Piguet et al (2011)
the weight of existing evidence suggests that ’rapid onset phenomena’ result in short-term
internal displacements as opposed to migrations further aﬁeld for longer durations. Whereas
we tend to associate international migration with migration over long distances, this might
not necessarily be the case. In regions with porous borders, such as Africa for example, the
costs of crossing an international border might well be lower than an internal migration over
longer distances. On average however, due to the increased costs of obtaining passports and
visas, we can assume that this conjecture generally holds. Moreover, they argue that many
of those aﬀected by such events return home quickly to begin rebuilding their lives. These
authors therefore argue that slower onset phenomena, i.e. gradual and sustained changes in
the environment over time, will likely result in longer-term migration, from which we might
also infer, migration over greater distances. As previously argued however, the macro level
literature paints a very diﬀerent picture. Naud´ e (2008) for example, argues that the correlation
between natural disasters and migration will be even stronger than the links between migration
and long-term climate change since such unforseen events give little time for people to adapt.
5.2 Unconditional eﬀects
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation 8. Two measures of long-run climatic factors
are considered. The ﬁrst examines the deviations of rainfall and temperature from their long-
run average, positive and negative deviations in both rainfall and temperatures. The second
instead examines the volatility of rainfall and temperature by dividing the decadal means by
the long-run country averages, termed anomalies. For each speciﬁcation two regressions are
estimated. In all regressions, both types of ﬁxed eﬀects are included, i.e. origin country ﬁxed
11Although the UNHCR produce bilateral estimates of refugees over time their data are incompatible
with ours for two reasons. Firstly, their data begins in 1970, such that we would have to drop one quar-
ter of our observations should they be included. More importantly however, the refugees are removed
from the original database by applying the totals provided by the United Nations Population Division (see:
http://esa.un.org/migration/), which are incompatible with those data which the UNHCR produce.
14eﬀects αi and time-destination ﬁxed eﬀects αj,t. In each regression, short-run climatic factors
are captured by the number of natural disasters during the decade in the origin country.
Columns (1) and (2) reports the results with anomalies, i.e. deviations of decadal means from
long-run averages and divided by long-run standard deviations. Columns (3) and (4) report the
absolute deviations. Columns (1) and (3) present results relating to positive temperatures and
negative rainfall. Columns (2) and (4) instead present the results for negative temperatures
and positive rainfall.
***Table 2 about here***
The coeﬃcients are elasticities or semi-elasticities such a 1% change corresponds to an equiv-
alent percentage change of the dependent variable equal to the size of the coeﬃcient. For
example a 1% rise in the wage ratio between origin and destination is associated with a
positive increase in bilateral migration ﬂows of about 0.33%. For the dummy variable such
as common language, the corresponding coeﬃcient can again be interpreted as a percentage
change only this time for switching the dummy from zero to one.
Overall, the regressions explain more than 60% of the variation in the observed migration
ﬂows. This ensures a very good ﬁt given that the migration rates are very heterogenous across
corridors. Given the breadth of our sample and the fact that our independent variable is
proxied by the diﬀerence in migrant stocks, the R2 are deemed reasonable. The coeﬃcients of
all of the explanatory variables, with the exception of those which capture long-run environ-
mental change, are highly signiﬁcant and in the expected direction. The coeﬃcients are also
very stable across the various models. Higher wage diﬀerentials, a larger diaspora, a lower
dependency ratio at origin, shared linguistic roots, contiguity and more frequent episodes of
international violence all beget higher migration ﬂows. Conversely, the larger the distance
between origin and destination, i.e. the greater the migration costs, the lower, on average, are
the associated migration ﬂows.
It might be desirable to give a ﬂavour of what the estimated elasticities of the other covariates
imply. Starting with the wage ratio, the value of the third quartile of the distribution of the
wage ratio is about 3. This means that between countries characterized by such a diﬀerence, an
increase by 0.3 in the wage ratio will lead to an increase of 3% in the migration ﬂows between
the two countries. Similarly, an increase of 10% in the diaspora abroad will lead to an increase
of about 4% in the ﬂow of new migrants over the next ten years. The obtained elasticity of
the network eﬀect is slightly lower than the one estimated by Beine et al. (2011) which is
about 0.65. Nevertheless, Beine et al. (2011) include only OECD countries as destinations,
giving important weight to South-North migration. It is expected that migrants involved
in this type of migration will heavily rely on networks. Interestingly, our subsequent sub-
sample analysis focusing on migration to the global South (Table 6) yields elasticities which
are much closer to those obtained by Beine et al. (2011). Common language is also found
to be an important determinant. Compared to pairs of countries with similar conditions,
countries having a common language in common experience migration ﬂows higher by 0.5%.
The presence of international violence at origin is a strong push factor as reﬂected by the
15estimated elasticity. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this concerns only a small set
of countries, since more than 90% did not have any episode of this kind over the last forty
years under investigation. Finally, the negative eﬀect of dependency ratio seems in line with
the fact a younger population has a higher propensity to migrate, all else equal.
Turning now to the environmental variables, the unconditional results yield no statistically
signiﬁcant results whatsoever, either concerning long-run or short-run factors. These regres-
sions capture the average impact of the explanatory factors on migration rates over time and
across countries. On the face of it, in line with some previous microeconomic ﬁndings such
as Munshi (2003), we might expect that both rain shortfalls (and high temperatures) might
provide an additional motivation for residents to become migrants. The insigniﬁcance of the
response to environmental factors can give rise to various alternative explanations.
First, we should be aware that the environmental variables capture only the direct impact of
climatic factors on international emigration. To the extent that climatic factors decrease the
income in origin countries, climatic factors will lead to a higher wage diﬀerential over time,
which in turn is found to lead to more emigration. This is supported by the signiﬁcant and
stable elasticity of emigration with respect to wage diﬀerential. Therefore, the absence of a
direct eﬀect does not rule out the existence of some signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect going through
economic incentives.
Second, the results here only concern international migration. As argued by Black et al (2011),
these are exactly the same factors which might in turn result in lower incomes from which
people have to pay to migrate. This is especially the case in poor countries. In other words,
although residents may choose to become international migrants, they might not have the
resources to actually move. If liquidity constraints are binding, internal migration to less
aﬀected areas within the same country is a valuable option. This means that people still move
but actually cannot aﬀord to cross the border. This case is not captured by our data although
we investigate this possibility in an extension.
This interpretation in turn calls for some additional inspection allowing for some heteroge-
nous response across origin countries to climatic events. Generally speaking, one possible
interpretation of the results is that our estimation mixes up cases that are very diﬀerent from
one another. If there is some impact of climatic factors, this will depend on one or several
factor(s) shaping the sensitivity of people to the climatic events. Unconditional regressions
would therefore be unable to uncover the heterogeneity in the response.
A third line of reasoning concerns the frequency of our observations, which are decennial. The
literature suggests that unexpected climatic shocks likely result in more temporary migrations
as opposed to long term climate change or variability which instead result in more permanent
migrations. It is quite possible therefore that migrants are directly impacted by climatic
change and variability as captured by our variables, but are not picked up in estimation due
to their returning home. Without more detailed microeconomic or bilateral migration ﬂow
data, this hypothesis is impossible to test for however.
165.3 Heterogenous eﬀects
Heterogeneity of responses can be related to several dimensions. First, the impact of climatic
factors might depend upon initial climatic conditions. Some rise in average temperature might
be particularly detrimental in already hot areas. Likewise, shortages in average rainfall will
particularly aﬀect those countries with poorer access to natural water sources. We therefore
use two conditioning climate variables. The ﬁrst relates to temperature. We consider hot
countries as ones over the median of the world temperatures (about 22.7 degrees). The second
instead relates to the presence of groundwater. We use the same classiﬁcation. Countries
are classiﬁed as having fewer groundwater reserves if they fall below the median of the world
groundwater distribution.
Another way to view heterogeneity is to distinguish countries’ geographical location. Climate
change does not aﬀect countries equally. Countries closer to the equator are often reported
to be disproportionately aﬀected by climate change. They also tend to be poorer compared
to countries from the northern hemisphere. Distance to the equator has been used as an
instrument for factors such as institutions in empirical studies of growth. Accordingly, we
interact the long-run climatic factors with a dummy that takes the value 1 should a country
lie below the median latitude to test whether the impact of temperature and rain anomalies
depends upon location.
A ﬁnal conditioning scheme is the economic structure. One might expect that the share of the
agricultural sector in the economy will aﬀect the sensitivity of the country to climatic events.
Farmers and people living in rural areas are often mentioned as those most aﬀected by climate
change. The same holds for ﬁshermen. As such, we use interaction terms between climatic
factors and a dummy variable which takes the value one should the share of agriculture in
total GDP be greater than the median.
***Tables 3 and 4 about here***
The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 gives the results using anomalies involv-
ing excess temperature and rainfall shortage. Table 4 reports the ﬁndings using anomalies
involving rain excess and colder temperatures. In each table, column (1) gives the results con-
ditioned by temperature. Column (2) reports ﬁndings conditional on a country’s agriculture
share. Column (3) reports the results conditioned on the presence of groundwater and ﬁnally,
column (4), reports the results with latitude as the conditioning variable.
The results in tables 3 and 4 do not support any signiﬁcant direct impact of either short-run
or long-run climatic factors on out migration. Whatever the conditioning scheme, positive or
negative rain or temperature anomalies do not seem to lead to more migration. Beyond the
comments provided above, one possible interpretation of these results is that climatic impacts
are far more complex than can be captured by a single dimension. In fact, it might be possible
for instance that excess temperature will lead to more emigration only in some particular
context, say for instance in middle income countries (so that candidates to migration can cover
migration costs) with speciﬁc initial climatic conditions and in which the agriculture share is
17signiﬁcant. Such circumstances are diﬃcult to capture using observed variables corresponding
to all those dimensions. As an alternative, we continue with our conditioning strategy, but
in this case we split the sample based on whether the destination countries are from the
countries of the relatively more aﬄuent global ’North’ or alternatively from the less wealthy
global ’South’.
5.4 Sub-Samples, Migrations to the Global ’North’ and ’South’
In this section, we continue with our conditioning scheme from the preceding section and
continue by further splitting our sample; restricting the regressions to include destinations
from the countries of the global ’North’ or ’South’.12 The results for the countries of the
’North’ are presented in Table 5, while Table 6 presents the results restricting migrations
to the countries of the global ’South’.13The results demonstrate marked diﬀerences between
the forces which shape migration to the North and South. All of the determinants tested
previously are important for migrations to the North, with the exception of contiguity and the
environmental variables. In comparison with the sample average however, network eﬀects are
less important. This reﬂects the fact that compared to the global sample, migration to the
North features more skilled agents (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). Skilled migrants have been
found to be less sensitive to networks than unskilled migrants (Beine et al., 2011, McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2010). In contrast, wage diﬀerentials are found to exert a higher role, which
is consistent with the main incentives of migrants coming to OECD countries. The elasticity
of the wage ratio is more or less 25% higher than the one obtained with the whole sample.
The coeﬃcient on distance is around one, while the coeﬃcient of contiguity is not signiﬁcant.
This reﬂects that migration to the North involves moves over longer distances. The point
estimates on the shared common ethnic language are around twice as large when compared
to the sample average. Once again, this reﬂects the importance of skilled migration for which
knowledge of languages proves important.
These results are in stark contrast to those for migrations to the global South. In this case, we
ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials, shared linguistic roots or interna-
tional violence. We do however, ﬁnd a strong and positive eﬀect on international migration of
sharing a common border, reﬂecting that South-South migration involves moves over shorter
distances. In the case of migrations to the global South however, we also ﬁnd some sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impacts of long-run environmental change. Across the sample of origin
countries which rely more heavily upon agriculture and which experienced negative volatilities
12The countries of the global ’North’ are taken to be those that remained aﬄuent over the period 1960-2000.
These include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, the USA, the EU-15 and the countries of the European
Free Trade Association.
13These tables only present the results analogous to those presented in Table 3. In other words, we abstract
from deviations which involve excess rainfall and colder temperatures. For the sake of brevity we also do
not provide unconditioned results across both restricted samples. The coeﬃcients obtained from these latter
regressions may be obtained from the authors although the results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those
presented in Tables 5 and 6.
18in rainfall, the century average precipitation was 125mm, while the average rainfall in 2000
was 118mm. A 10% rise in this negative volatility, which is equivalent to a decrease in average
rainfall across the decade 1990-2000 of approximately 1mm, is associated with a decrease in
international migration to the countries of the global South of (2.41-1.14=) 1.27%. This result
is similar to those origins which are conditioned upon the initial level of groundwater, only this
time the signs are reversed. Across the sample of countries which have fewer water resources,
the century average precipitation was 89mm, while the average decadal rainfall across the
decade 1990-2000 was just 80mm. A 10% rise in this negative volatility, which is again equiv-
alent to a decrease in average rainfall across the decade 1990-2000 of approximately 1mm, is
associated with an increase in international migration of (3.82-1.37=) 2.45% to the countries
of the global South. In both tables, across all the various speciﬁcations, we again fail to ﬁnd
any aﬀect of natural disasters on international migration.
***Tables 5 and 6 about here***
5.5 Robustness check: adjustment for return migration
In the benchmark estimations, we have made a particular choice regarding the dependent
variables, i.e. bilateral migration rates. Indeed, we have excluded from the sample negative
ﬂows and have estimated our models on a sample including only zero or positive ﬂows. Neg-
ative ﬂows are obtained as a result of a negative variation in migration stocks. Decreases of
bilateral migration stocks can in turn reﬂect particular processes regarding demographic de-
velopments. One is the combination of signiﬁcant death rates of some old diasporas which are
not fully counterbalanced by new migration ﬂows. Another development is return migration
that outweighs the arrival of new migrants. Ideally, one should account for those ﬂows since
return migration actually reﬂects the impact of push factors at destination or the reduced
attractiveness of destination countries over time.
While there is no direct way to account for return migration and deaths, we provide a robust-
ness check based on one particularly extreme hypothesis. We recompute the bilateral migration
ﬂows assuming that decreases in migration stocks totally reﬂect the return of migrants to their
origin country. We add the opposite value of the negative ﬂows between country i and country
j to the observed migration ﬂow between country j and country i. Using the new bilateral
migration ﬂows, we re-estimate model (8). We follow the strategy considered in sections 5.2.
and 5.3. again considering therefore any unconditional response in addition to interactions
conditional on various country characteristics (equivalent to table 3). The results are reported
in Tables 7 and 8. Regarding the role of the other covariates such as wages, networks, distance
and the factors at origin results are extremely similar to those of the benchmark regressions.
***Tables 7 and 8 about here***
The robustness checks yield interesting results. We ﬁnd that the results peculiar to the impact
of natural disasters are quite robust with respect to the benchmark results. We do not ﬁnd
any impact of natural disasters on international emigration. With regards the role of long-run
19factors, the coeﬃcients are of a similar magnitude and in the same direction as those presented
in table 2, but in some cases are now statistically signiﬁcant, thereby assigning a modest role to
excess temperatures as push factors. Further conditioning our results on origin characteristics
we ﬁnd no conclusive evidence of climatic change, climatic variation or of natural disasters
upon international migration.
6 The internal migration hypothesis
The previous results give little support to the hypothesis that long-run climate changes and
natural disasters have spurred signiﬁcant international migration. While we ﬁnd some role
for those phenomena under some particular circumstances, the overall impact remains very
limited. In any case, our results question the idea that climate change could create a big
rise in the number of international environmental refugees. In particular, we show evidence
that environmental factors play little role compared to economic, political and demographic
variables. Does this imply that climatic factors do not increase people’s mobility? The answer
is not necessarily in the aﬃrmative. One possibility is that people aﬀected by adverse climatic
changes or by disasters move internally rather than internationally. This possibility might
be particularly relevant in developing countries in which people are likely to be ﬁnancially
constrained. If climatic changes tend to depress income, then liquidity constraints might
prevent people to move internationally since international migration costs are signiﬁcantly
larger. In that case, they might favour internal migration.
In this section, we investigate whether there is empirical support for a relationship between
climatic factors and internal migration in our sample. A direct test in the previous econometric
frameworks we relied upon is nevertheless impossible, since no data on internal migration is
available for all countries for the period of our investigation. Data on migration within the
same country deﬁnitely exist in some countries. Data on interprovincial migration ﬂows in
Canada is for instance available over a 20-year period. Nevertheless, at the world level, there
is no data on internal migration which is comparable across countries and over time.
One alternative way of capturing internal migration is to use the evolution of urbanization
of countries. The idea is that internal movements of people, dominated by rural to urban
migration, leads to an increase in the urbanization rate. This idea has been implemented by
Barrios et al. (2006) who look at the impact of climatic change on the pattern of urbanization
in sub-Saharan African countries. Those authors look speciﬁcally at the role of the change
in rainfall, which in a context of structural shortage of water, leads people from rural areas
to migrate to cities. Their sample comprises developing countries although the authors focus
upon sub-Saharan African countries. We extend Barrios et al. (2009)’s work by looking at the
role of our climatic variables for the complete sample of countries over the full investigation
period. We account for the traditional determinants of the urbanization process identiﬁed in
the empirical literature (see for example Davis and Henderson, 2003). The controls include
the level democracy, the level of income, population density at the country level as well as
20openness.14 In its synthetic form, the estimated relationship takes the following form:
ln(Urbi,t) = β1ln(Xi,t) + β2ln(Ei,t) + αt + αi + ǫi,t (9)
where Xi,t includes the controls of urbanization of country i at time t, and Ei,t includes as
before the environmental factors. The model includes country ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies
to control for time-invariant country speciﬁc factors and country-invariant time speciﬁc factors
respectively. The model is estimated for two samples over the full period (1960-2000) again
using decennial data. The ﬁrst sample includes all countries, while the second only includes
developing countries only. Since the inclusion of Xi,t signiﬁcantly reduces the number of
observations due to missing data, we start with the full model but also present the results
of more parsimonious speciﬁcations. Regarding the long-run climatic factors, we implement
those which capture excess temperatures and rain shortages, as in Tables 3 and 5.15
The results of Table 9 provide some interesting insights. First, the process of urbanization is
found to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between developed and developing countries. This is not
surprising given the importance of factors such as income or the industrial development. With
respect to sensitivities of internal migration (as proxied by urbanization), there are also some
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Climatic factors turn out to play little role at the world level, i.e. when
mixing up developed and developing countries. Neither the long-run volatilities in tempera-
ture and rainfall, nor the occurrence of natural disasters appear to be robust determinants
of rural-urban migration. In contrast, for developing countries, natural disasters turn out to
increase urbanization, even when accounting for its traditional correlates. The positive elas-
ticity of urbanization to the number of natural disasters is consistent with the fact that people
from rural areas aﬀected by natural disasters tend to primarily migrate to the cities of their
country. This is consistent with the fact that potential migrants from developing countries
favour domestic destinations that involve lower migration costs, in turn implying that liquidity
constraints might be binding for a signiﬁcant number of potential movers. Our results also
provide evidence that these internal movements are often more permanent than some of the
micro-economic literature suggests.
14Democracy exerts an ambiguous theoretical eﬀect on urbanization. On the one hand, more democracy
lead on average to fewer restrictions on people mobility, favoring urbanization. On the other hand, wealth is
more evenly distributed in democratic countries, allowing for the development of small and medium cities as
opposed to the concentration of wealth in a few major cities. Population density tends to favor urbanization
as less land is available to people to settle in rural communities. Openness tends also to favor urbanization
through the economic development of the country.
15We obtain similar results with excess of rain and negative deviations of temperature as well as with
volatility measures in the sense that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect. These results are available upon
request.
217 Conclusion
In this paper we ﬁrst derive a simple utility maximization model, which incorporates en-
vironmental change in the context of ’amenities’ at origin. We then test this model using
a previously unexploited panel dataset of bilateral migration ﬂows, which cover the period
1960-2000. We account for all classiﬁcations of determinants and additionally implement ori-
gin speciﬁc and destination country-year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for numerous unobserved
factors. To date, this is arguably the most sophisticated macroeconomic model used to assess
the eﬀects of climate change on international migration. We ﬁnd little to no support for any
long-run relationship between either short-run or long-run climatic change on international
migration. These results are robust when further considering migrants returning home. While
our ﬁndings are certainly at odds with the macro-level literature, our ﬁndings oﬀer support to
much of the micro-level climate change literature which instead argues that the environmental
change tends to result in more temporary internal movements.
Further conditioning our regressions upon origin country characteristics, we ﬁnd evidence that
shortfalls in precipitation constrain migration to developing countries from those which rely
more heavily upon agriculture and spur movements to developing countries from those with
fewer groundwater reserves. We further use the rate of urbanization as a proxy for internal
migration and ﬁnd strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater ﬂows of migrants
to urban environs and our results suggest that at least some of these movements are more
permanent than previous results suggest. Overall, our results show that climate change and
climatic variations have little impact upon long-run international migration. Our results do not
however serve to deny that climate change has any aﬀect whatsoever. Rather, no direct impact
is found, suggesting that environmental changes inﬂuence international migration through
other channels, for example through wage diﬀerentials.
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269 Appendix: list of countries
9.1 Destinations (166)
Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Australia Aus-
tria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana
Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape
Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, the
Democratic Republic of the Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Cuba Cyprus Denmark Djibouti Do-
minica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Fin-
land France Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-
Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Lao Peoples Democratic Republic Lebanon Lesotho
Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali
Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia, Federated States of Mongolia
Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua
Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines
Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lu-
cia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia
Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon Islands Somalia
South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab
Republic Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia
Turkey Tuvalu Uganda United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America
Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
9.2 Origins (137)
Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Australia Austria Bahrain Bangladesh Belgium
Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon
Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, the
Democratic Republic of the Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Cuba Cyprus Denmark Djibouti Do-
minican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Finland France
Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Hon-
duras Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica
Japan Jordan Kenya Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Lao
Peoples Democratic Republic Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Madagascar
Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia
Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama
Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Fed-
eration Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon
27Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian
Arab Republic Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia
Turkey Uganda United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay
Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
28Table 2: Impact of climate on migration: unconditional results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -4.130*** -4.102*** -4.167*** -4.151***
(1.234) (1.223) (1.226) (1.288)
Wage ratio 0.319** 0.326** 0.325** 0.338**
(0.150) (0.153) (0.152) (0.148)
Distance -0.766*** -0.764*** -0.767*** -0.765***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091)
Network 0.398*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.399***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)
Common Language 0.460*** 0.459*** 0.461*** 0.458***
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.138)
Contiguity 0.409** 0.409** 0.409** 0.409**
(0.166) (0.168) (0.168) (0.171)
Dependency -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
International Violence 0.379*** 0.374*** 0.381*** 0.372***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Natural Disasters 0.062 0.072 0.059 0.057
(0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.085)
Rain Deviation/Anomaly -0.003 0.025 0.007 0.037
(0.058) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055)
Temperature Deviation/Anomaly 0.040 0.018 0.049 -0.004
(0.0453) (0.055) (0.037) (0.040)
Origin country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (jt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 62,234 62,234 62,234 62,234
R2 0.626 0.628 0.626 0.625
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
29Table 3: Conditional impact of climate on migration: excess temperature and rain shortage.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditioning temp agricult water latitude
constant -4.175*** -4.080*** -4.137*** -4.121***
(1.213) (1.255) (1.233) (1.229)
Wage ratio 0.320** 0.340** 0.298** 0.314**
(0.150) (0.154) (0.152) (0.150)
Distance -0.766*** -0.765*** -0.768*** -0.766***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Network 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.398***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Common Language 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.132) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135)
Contiguity 0.400** 0.409** 0.406** 0.408**
(0.163) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165)
Dependency -0.013** -0.014** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
International Violence 0.405*** 0.394*** 0.387*** 0.382***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Natural Disasters 0.061 0.047 0.062 0.068
(0.084) (0.087) (0.084) (0.084)
Rain Anomaly -0.069 -0.026 -0.027 -0.014
(0.082) (0.087) (0.069) (0.061)
Temperature Anomaly 0.089 -0.005 0.053 0.041
(0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.047)
Rain*condition 0.145 0.061 -0.026 0.172
(0.098) (0.106) (0.090) (0.112)
Temperature*condition -0.106 0.114 -0.026 -0.005
(0.094) (0.093) (0.090) (0.125)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (αjt)) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 62,234 62,234 62,234 62,234
R2 0.630 0.629 0.625 0.626
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
30Table 4: Conditional impact of climate on migration: temperature shortage and rain excess.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditioning temp agricult water latitude
constant -4.117*** -4.239*** -3.940*** -4.073***
(1.201) (1.192) (1.214) (1.227)
Wage ratio 0.352** 0.324** 0.357** 0.328**
(0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.154)
Distance -0.764*** -0.765*** -0.763*** -0.764***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.085) (0.088)
Network 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.399***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)
Common Language 0.453*** 0.461*** 0.456*** 0.458***
(0.133) (0.135) (0.132) (0.136)
Contiguity 0.410** 0.405** 0.414** 0.409**
(0.166) (0.167) (0.165) (0.167)
Dependency -0.013** -0.012** -0.015*** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
International Violence 0.382*** 0.395*** 0.328*** 0.374***
(0.092) (0.094) (0.098) (0.092)
Natural Disasters 0.054 0.065 0.078 0.072
(0.096) (0.091) (0.088) (0.089)
Rain Anomaly 0.064 -0.006 0.010 0.029
(0.052) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040)
Temperature Anomaly 0.034 0.057 0.056 0.019
(0.076) (0.079) (0.067) (0.057)
Rain*condition -0.099 0.064 0.085 -0.093
(0.080) (0.072) (0.110) (0.125)
Temperature*condition -0.048 -0.084 -0.200* -0.025
(0.086) (0.088) (0.112) (0.088)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (αjt)) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 62,234 62,234 62,234 62,234
R2 0.630 0.629 0.636 0.628
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
31Table 5: Conditional impact of climate on migration, to the countries of the Global North:
excess temperatures and rain shortages.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditioning temp agricult water latitude
constant 1.245 1.504 1.447 1.318
(1.405) (1.412) (1.415) (1.411)
Wage ratio 0.500*** 0.556*** 0.554*** 0.523***
(0.194) (0.196) (0.192) (0.193)
Distance -1.098*** -1.100*** -1.103*** -1.102***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Network 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.172***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Common Language 0.941*** 0.930*** 0.943*** 0.938***
(0.180) (0.178) (0.182) (0.180)
Contiguity 0.460 0.465 0.483 0.470
(0.317) (0.315) (0.323) (0.319)
Dependency -0.013* -0.015** -0.014* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
International Violence 0.467*** 0.474*** 0.442*** 0.465***
(0.101) (0.104) (0.101) (0.103)
Natural Disasters 0.084 0.029 0.045 0.058
(0.108) (0.114) (0.105) (0.109)
Rain Anomaly -0.071 -0.075 0.028 -0.049
(0.072) (0.074) (0.060) (0.084)
Temperature Anomaly 0.119 0.015 0.068 0.039
(0.075) (0.080) (0.067) (0.081)
Rain*condition 0.136 0.180 -0.148 0.084
(0.097) (0.113) (0.097) (0.102)
Temperature*condition -0.180 0.096 -0.059 0.044
(0.125) (0.128) (0.141) (0.123)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (αjt)) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 11,393 11,393 11,393 11,393
R2 0.685 0.687 0.679 0.684
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
32Table 6: Conditional impact of climate on migration, to the countries of the Global South:
excess temperatures and rain shortages.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditioning temp agricult water latitude
constant -7.997*** -7.622*** -7.515*** -7.852***
(1.392) (1.376) (1.375) (1.382)
Wage ratio 0.150 0.109 0.068 0.124
(0.175) (0.178) (0.181) (0.175)
Distance -0.467*** -0.468*** -0.479*** -0.468***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088)
Network 0.573*** 0.572*** 0.571*** 0.573***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Common Language 0.140 0.142 0.143 0.145
(0.119) (0.117) (0.117) (0.119)
Contiguity 0.272** 0.277** 0.265** 0.275**
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117)
Dependency -0.010 -0.013* -0.013* -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
International Violence 0.126 0.096 0.110 0.097
(0.241) (0.244) (0.238) (0.241)
Natural Disasters 0.001 -0.020 -0.032 -0.008
(0.097) (0.094) (0.093) (0.096)
Rain Anomaly -0.028 0.114* -0.137* 0.071
(0.067) (0.061) (0.070) (0.066)
Temperature Anomaly 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.035
(0.078) (0.060) (0.064) (0.059)
Rain*condition 0.061 -0.241** 0.382** -0.166*
(0.093) (0.105) (0.129) (0.099)
Temperature*condition 0.007 0.012 0.035 -0.044
(0.105) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (αjt)) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 50,841 50,841 50,841 50,841
R2 0.833 0.835 0.834 0.834
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
33Table 7: Accounting for return migration: unconditional results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -5.438*** -5.379*** -5.405*** -5.562***
(1.186) (1.181) (1.152) (1.212)
Wage ratio 0.344** 0.363** 0.355** 0.372**
(0.161) (0.163) (0.160) (0.162)
Distance -0.792*** -0.789*** -0.792*** -0.791***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
Network 0.413*** 0.414*** 0.413*** 0.415***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Common Language 0.551*** 0.546*** 0.552*** 0.545***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.134)
Contiguity 0.0120 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.156) (0.156) (0.155) (0.158)
Dependency -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
International Violence 0.376*** 0.361*** 0.373*** 0.361***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
Natural Disasters 0.021 0.034 0.022 0.018
(0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078)
Rain Deviation/Anomaly 0.003 0.039 -0.015 0.088*
(0.059) (0.038) (0.042) (0.052)
Temperature Deviation/Anomaly 0.082* -0.031 0.079** -0.041
(0.042) (0.052) (0.035) (0.039)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (jt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 71,696 71,696 71,696 71,696
R2 0.579 0.576 0.579 0.578
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
34Table 8: Accounting for return migration: conditional impact
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditioning temp agricult water latitude
constant -5.542*** -5.420*** -5.549*** -5.455***
(1.162) (1.217) (1.176) (1.183)
Wage ratio 0.299* 0.352** 0.263* 0.350**
(0.155) (0.165) (0.155) (0.162)
Distance -0.791*** -0.791*** -0.794*** -0.791***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Network 0.415*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.413***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Common Language 0.544*** 0.548*** 0.552*** 0.551***
(0.130) (0.134) (0.132) (0.134)
Contiguity 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.012
(0.153) (0.156) (0.154) (0.155)
Dependency -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
International Violence 0.404*** 0.383*** 0.378*** 0.392***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
Natural Disasters 0.031 0.012 0.035 0.031
(0.076) (0.079) (0.075) (0.078)
Rain Anomaly -0.084 0.003 -0.033 -0.014
(0.078) (0.088) (0.064) (0.062)
Temperature Anomaly 0.113** 0.057 0.059 0.086**
(0.055) (0.053) (0.048) (0.044)
Rain*condition 0.174* 0.003 0.103 0.212*
((0.094) (0.103) (0.097) (0.110)
Temperature*condition -0.070 0.072 0.068 -0.065
(0.084) (0.084) (0.086) (0.122)
Origin country Dummies (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-Year Dummies (αjt)) Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 71,696 71,696 71,696 71,696
R2 0.585 0.579 0.581 0.577
Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
35Table 9: Internal migration and environmental factors
Full sample Developing Countries
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 0.913*** 2.311*** 2.230*** 1.419*** 2.044*** 2.186***
(0.258) (0.121) (0.096) (0.295) (0.117) (0.097)
Nat. Disasters 0.028 0.016 0.054*** 0.045** 0.035** 0.070***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014)
Rain shortages -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.019 -0.005 -0.003
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Excess temp -0.017* -0.015* -0.007 -0.004 -0.015 -0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Pop. density 0.034*** - - 0.013* - -
(0.005) (0.007)
income 0.034 -0.012 - 0.061*** 0.033* -
(0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
democracy -0.0012** - - -0.0010** - -
(0.0005) (0.0005)
openness 0.0009* - - 0.0009* - -
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# observations 570 828 1010 468 713 895
R2 0.955 0.939 0.933 0.951 0.939 0.932
Dependent variable: log of (urbanization rate). Estimation period: 1960-2000.
Superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
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